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Abstract
In this paper we present an algorithm to compute keyed hash function (message authentication code
MAC). Our approach uses a family of expander graphs of large girth denoted D(n, q), where n is a natural
number bigger than one and q is a prime power. Expander graphs are known to have excellent expansion
properties and thus they also have very good mixing properties. All requirements for a good MAC are
satisfied in our method and a discussion about collisions and preimage resistance is also part of this work.
The outputs closely approximate the uniform distribution and the results we get are indistinguishable
from random sequences of bits. Exact formulas for timing are given in term of number of operations
per bit of input. Based on the tests, our method for implementing DMAC shows good efficiency in
comparison to other techniques. 4 operations per bit of input can be achieved. The algorithm is very
flexible and it works with messages of any length. Many existing algorithms output a fixed length tag,
while our constructions allow generation of an arbitrary length output, which is a big advantage.
1 Introduction
Our work is motivated by the work of Charles, Goren and Lauter, [6]. They proposed the construction of
collision resistant hash function from expander graphs. The family of graphs they used were Ramanujan
graphs constructed by Lubotzky, Philips and Sarnak (see [18]) and Pizer’s Ramanujan graphs, [23]. Hash
functions from LPS require 7 field multiplications per bit of input, but the field size may need to be bigger
(1024 bit prime p instead of 256 bits, for example), and the output is 4log(p) bits. When the hash function
from Pizer’s graph G(p, l), for l = 2, requires 2log(p) field multiplications per bit of input, which is quite
inefficient (the authors propose to use a graph of cryptographic size p ≈ 2256). The output of this hash
function is log(p) bits. The idea presented in [6] is very good, but collisions for this hash were found (see
[26]). However, expander graphs can be used to produce keyed hash function (message authentication code).
When secret parameters are involved (like colouring and initial vertex) the adversary cannot find collision
with mentioned method.
We propose a construction of message authentication code based on another family of expander graphs
D(n, q) of large girth, [16]. The most important advantages are: the output can have arbitrary length
(like in case of variants of SHA-3: SHAKE128 and SHAKE256), max message size is unlimited and the
performance is very good (4 field operations per bit of input can be achieved). Another advantage of our
construction is that graphs from the family D(n, q) have a nice representation by vectors and incidence
relations are described by system of multivariate equations, which is very easy to implement. From the other
side such systems of nonlinear equations are used for multivariate cryptography that is considered to be a
good candidate for a post-quantum cryptography, [10].
The basics about hash function and keyed hash function (message authentication code; MAC) can be
found in [25]. A hash function accepts a messageM as input and produces a fixed-size hash value h = H(M).
Hash functions are often used to determine whether or not data has changed. In general terms, the main
goal of a hash function is to ensure data integrity.However it can be also used for authentication, to create
one way password files, as a source of pseudorandom numbers (bits) or for intrusion and virus detection. A
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Figure 1: Message authentication using MAC
cryptographic hash function is a function that is acceptable for security applications. It means that it shall
be computationally infeasible to find
i a x that is the preimage of h for a hash value h = H(x) (one way property),
ii two data objects x 6= y, for which H(x) = H(y) (the collision-free property).
In addition, a good hash function has the property that the output looks like random data and even a small
change in input causes big changes in the output.
It is possible to use a hash function but no encryption for a message authentication. There are a few
techniques to achieve this: use hash function + encryption on the hash, compute a hash value over the
concatenation of M and S (a common secret value) and append the resulting hash value to the message or
use keyed hash function. There are many reasons why it is worth to use techniques that avoid encryption [12].
For example, if there is no need to keep message confident but we want to authenticate it, those techniques
are faster.
Figure 1 illustrates the mechanism for message authentication using keyed hash function. In order to
check the integrity of the message, the keyed hash function is applied to the message and the result is
compared with the associated tag. The secret key Ks is known for the receiver and for the sender, so the
sender can be easily verified. The MAC approach guarantees data integrity and authenticity.
2 Background
Graphs of large girth We define the girth of a graph as the length of the shortest cycle. In the analyzed
context girth is a very important property of the graph. Let {Gi}i∈N be a family of k-regular graphs with
increasing order. Let gi and vi denote respectively the girth and the order of the graph Gi. A family of
graphs with increasing girth is a sequence of graphs such that gi ≤ gj for i < j. According to the definition
introduced in [1], we say that a family of k-regular graphs is a family of graphs of large girth if
gi ≥ γ logk−1(vi)
for a constant γ and all i ≥ 1.
A nice survey about graphs of large girth is presented in [2]. It is known that γ = 2 (see [5]) is the
best possible constant, but there is no explicit construction of such family of graphs for which it can be
obtained. This topic started in 1959 when Paul Erdős proved existence of such families with bounded degree
k and γ = 1/4, without providing a construction [7]. There have been numerous investigations of the field by
several authors. However, until 2017 the list of major known results is short. The list of explicit constructions
is the following:
1. the first explicit construction of such family with γ = 0.44, denoted by X(p, q), where p and q are
primes was introduced by G. A. Margulis in 1982 [19],
2. generalisation of the family X(p, q) proposed by M. Morgenstern [22],
3. constructions for arbitrary k with γ = 0.48 and construction of family of 3-regular graphs with γ = 0.96
obtained by V. Imrich in 1983 [13],
4. family of sextet graphs introduced in 1983 by Biggs and Hoare [4] (Alfred Weiss [33] proved that
γ = 43 ),
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5. second construction by G. A. Margulis in 1988 [20],
6. constructions of cubic graphs, presented in a popular article [2],
7. construction by Lubotzky, Phillips and Sarnak [18] (Biggs and Boshier [3] proved that γ = 43 for this
family of graphs),
8. algebraic graphs CD(n, q) given by the nonlinear system of equations over finite field Fq, with γ ≥ logq(q − 1),
[15] (Furedi [8] proved that for arbitrary prime power q: γ = logq(q − 1)),
9. the polarity graphs of CD(n, q) (see [17]) has an induced subgraph of degree q− 1 which is a family of
graphs of large girth (it is shown in [31]).
Expander graphs An important property that a family of graphs must have in order to be a good
candidate for a construction of a hash function is to be a family of expander graphs. Cryptographic hash
function from expander graphs were presented in works of [6, 27,35].
Let’s consider a spectrum of a graph with eigenvalues λ0 > λ1 > ... > λs−1. A family of k-regular graphs
of increasing order {Gi}i∈N is called a family of Ramanujan graphs if |λ1(Gi)| ≤ 2
√
k − 1 for all i ([11], p.
452). If k is stable and vi → ∞ the limit 2
√
k − 1 is the best we can get. Ramanujan graphs are the best
expanders.
3 The family of graphs D(n, q)
The family of graphs we use in our construction of a MAC was introduced in 1992 by Lazebnik and Ustimenko,
[15]. It is denoted by D(n, q), n ∈ N≥2 and q is a prime power. The similar notations that we use appeared
later and can be found in [16]. To simplify, we don’t use double notations for coordinates of vectors. The
family D(n, q) is special because of a few important properties. The first one is that this is a family of graphs
of a large girth, as mentioned in Sec. 2. Secondly, this is a family of very good expander graphs that are
close to Ramanujan graphs. The idea of almost Ramanujan graphs was introduced in [28]. We refer to a
family of k-regular graphs as almost Ramanujan graphs if |λ1(Gi)| ≤ 2
√
k for all i. Graphs D(n, q), n ≥ 2 for
arbitrary q form a family of q-regular almost Ramanujan graphs (|λ1(Gi)| ≤ 2√q) and thus have excellent
mixing properties.
Graphs D(n, q) are bipartite with set of vertices V containing two subsets: V = P ∪L, where P ∩L = ∅.
Originally the subset of vertices P is called a set of points and another set L is called a set of lines. Let P
and L be two copies of Cartesian power Fqn, where n ≥ 2 is a integer. Two types of brackets are used in
order to distinguish points from lines. We write (~z) if ~z ∈ P and [~z] if ~z ∈ L. The set of vertices of graph
D(n, q) (collection of points and lines) can be considered as n-dimensional vectors over Fq:
(~p) =(p1, p2, p3, p4, ..., pn),
[~l] =[l1, l2, l3, l4, ..., ln].
Coordinates of (~p) and [~l] are elements of finite field Fq. Because of this we have: |P | = |L| = qn and
|V | = 2qn. The vertex (~p) (point (~p)) is incident with the vertex [~l] (line [~l]) and we write: (~p)I[~l], if the
following relations between their coordinates hold:
l2 − p2 = l1p1
l3 − p3 = l2p1
l4 − p4 = l1p2
li − pi = l1pi−2
li+1 − pi+1 = li−1p1
li+2 − pi+2 = lip1
li+3 − pi+3 = l1pi+1
(1)
where i ≥ 5. The set of edges E consists of all pairs ((~p), [~l]) for which (~p)I[~l]. This is a family of q-regular
graphs, which means that each vertex has exactly q neighbors. D(n, q) becomes disconnected for n ≥ 6.
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Graphs D(n, q) are edge transitive. It means that their connected components are isomorphic. A connected
component of D(n, q) is denoted by CD(n, q). Notice that all connected components of infinite graph D(q)
are q-regular trees. The length of the shortest cycle (the girth) of a graph D(n, q) is given by the formula:
g(D(n, q)) =
{
n+ 5, for odd n
n+ 4, for even n
Graphs D(n, q) were successfully used as a base for symmetric and public key multivariate cryptography
(see for example: [14, 24, 30–32]), error correcting codes (see [9]) and pseudorandom number generator
[36]. The related cryptosystems are very good candidates for post quantum cryptography and resistant to
linearization attacks. The base of our message authentication code is a stream cipher algorithm where most
of the constructions of message authentication functions are based on block ciphers.
4 Keyed hash function
Few notations are used in this work. Let M denote the message, N the number of bits per block of the
M and by l(M) we represent the number of blocks. So the message can be expressed as M = m. . .ml(M).
We consider that the message is written in alphabet that corresponds to elements of finite field Fq and by
l(q) we denote the number of bits needed to represent number q (for example UTF-8 uses number field
F28). Calculations shall be performed in bigger number field than the number field (Fq) that is used for
the alphabet in order to achieve collection resistance property. Let denote by FQ the number field used for
calculations. The choice of N determines FQ. Any change in message shall change the hash so different
input blocks mi shall correspond to different edge colouring. To achieve it the following condition shall be
satisfied
Q ≥ 2N .
It is convenient to choose Q = p, where p is a prime number. In such case field arithmetic is simply modulo
p arithmetic.
From now on we denote by h the size of output (tag). The input message M is used as direction for
walking around the graph D(n,Q). We start with initial vertex IV = ~v0, which we consider to be a point
((~v0) ∈ P ). The next visited vertex is obtained by the formula
Nt(~w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn)) = [(w1 + t)
2, ∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
],
Nt(~w = [w1, w2, . . . , wn]) = ((w1 + t)
2, ∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
),
where ∗ can be uniquely calculated from equations (1) (see Example 1). Recall that D(n, q) graphs are
bipartite: points cannot be incident to points and lines cannot be incident to lines.
Example 1. Let consider graph D(6, 11) and ~w ∈ P .
N3(~w = (1, 8, 4, 2, 7, 0)) = [(1 + 3)
2, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗]
Names are assigned for ∗: [(1 + 3)2, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗] = [5, l2, l3, l4, l5, l6]. Then
l2 − 8 = 5 · 1
l3 − 4 = l2 · 1
l4 − 2 = 5 · 8
l5 − 7 = 5 · 4
l6 − 0 = l4 · 1
(2)
where all operations are in finite field F11. The calculated neighbor of (~w) is [5, 2, 6, 9, 5, 9].
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Figure 2: General structure of the DMAC-1
We propose two approaches to calculate the keyed hash function based on this family of graphs. We named
the message authentication codes DMAC, because constructions are based on family of graphsD(n, q). Keyed
hash functions use a secret, which is used to calculate the hash. We propose a secret key to be a pair (IV, S).
IV is an initial vector of length n with coordinates from Fq. S is a password of s characters from alphabet
Fq such that
s ≤ 1
2
g(D(n,Q)).
In our constructions, after all blocks mi of a message are processed, we process a password S. The details
are described in the next subsections.
4.1 Basic construction (DMAC-1)
Fig. 2 illustrates the first type of proposed DMAC’s. Steps to authenticate the message with DMAC-1:
1. Agree secret key Ks, which is a pair (IV, S).
2. split M in blocks mi of length N (add padding if needed)
3. Process the message. For i = 0, . . . , l(M)− 1 do
• Characters of the block of message mi are concatenated to obtain a number Mi.
• Calculate the vertex ~vi+1 which is incident to vertex ~vi. So, we calculate the next visited vertex
by using operator NMi(vi):
NMi(~vi = (v
i
1, v
i
2, . . . , v
i
n)) = [(v
i
imodn+1 +Mi)
2 mod Q, ∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
],
NMi(~vi = [v
i
1, v
i
2, . . . , v
i
n]) = ((v
i
imodn+1 +Mi)
2 mod Q, ∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
),
where ∗ are calculated from equations (1). We start in vertex ~v0 that is equal to IV .
4. Process the password S. For a i = l(M), . . . , l(M) + r − 1 do
• Calculate the vertex ~vi+1 which is incident to vertex ~vi. So, we calculate the next visited vertex
by using operator NSi(~vi):
NSi(~vi = (v
i
1, v
i
2, . . . , v
i
n)) = [(v
i
imodn+1 + Si)
2 mod Q, ∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
],
NSi(~vi = [v
i
1, v
i
2, . . . , v
i
n]) = ((v
i
imodn+1 + Si)
2 mod Q, ∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
),
where ∗ are calculated from equations (1). We start in vertex ~vl(M) (the last visited vertex in step
3).
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Figure 3: General structure of the DMAC-2
4.2 Modified construction (DMAC-2)
For n ≥ 6 graphs become disconnected. In order to move from one component to another we can use simple
modifications presented in Fig. 3. A vectors addition + over FQ is added.
In this case steps to authenticate the message with message authentication code are the same like for
DMAC-1 except one additional step. Steps to authenticate the message with DMAC-2:
1. Agree secret key Ks, which is a pair (IV, S).
2. split M in blocks mi of length N (add padding if needed)
3. Process the message. For i = 0, . . . , l(M)− 1 do
• Characters of the block of message mi are concatenated to obtain the number Mi.
• Calculate the vertex ~vi+1 which is incident to vertex ~vi. So, we calculate the next visited vertex
by using operator NMi(~vi). We start in vertex ~v0 that is equal to IV .
• Add vectors ~vi and ~vi+1 over FQ.
4. Process the password S. For a i = l(M), . . . , l(M) + r − 1 do
• Calculate the vertex ~vi+1 which is incident to vertex ~vi. So, we calculate the next visited vertex
by using operator NSi(~vi). We start in vertex ~vl(M) (the last visited vertex in step 3).
• Add vectors ~vi and ~vi+1 over FQ.
Example 2. (A toy example) Let’s consider the following example. The alphabet is F29. We want to
calculate DMAC-2 of 15 bits (h = 15) for a message M and a secret key Ks.
A B C D E F ... Z . , –
0 1 2 3 4 5 ... 25 26 27 28
M :A–BEAUTIFUL–DAY corresponds to the vector (0, 28, 1, 4, 0, ..., 24)
S :.AY corresponds to the vector (26, 0, 24)
IV = (5, 10, 27) = ~v0
In this case l(q) = 5 bits. We shall use n that satisfies: h 6 n · l(q). Hence n = 3. If we set N = 25 bits
then each block has 5 characters and we decide to use Q = 33554467. We use graph D(3, 33554467). We
have 3 blocks (l(M) = 3) total and the last block is padded:
m1 = (0, 28, 1, 4, 0)
m2 = (20, 19, 8, 5, 20)
m3 = (11, 28, 30, 24, 0)
1. i = 0
~v1 = NM1(
~(v0) = [(v
0
1 +M1)
2 mod 33554467, v12 , v
1
3 ]
= [(5 + 28140)2 mod 33554467, v12 , v
1
3 ]
= [20388284, 1278029, 6390172]
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because {
v12 − 10 = 20388284 · 5
v13 − 27 = v12 · 5
~v1 := ~v1 + ~v0 = [20388289, 1278039, 6390199]
2. i = 1
~v2 = NM2(
~(v1) = ((v
1
2 +M2)
2 mod 33554467, v22 , v
2
3)
= ((1278039 + 20198520)2 mod 33554467, v22 , v
2
3)
= (30968786, 21891813, 29421730)
because {
1278039− v22 = 20388289 · 30968786
6390199− v23 = 1278039 · 30968786
~v2 := ~v2 + ~v1 = (17802608, 23169852, 2257462)
3. i = 2
~v3 = NM3(
~(v2) = [(v
2
3 +M3)
2 mod 33554467, v32 , v
3
3 ]
= [(2257462 + 112830240)2 mod 33554467, v32 , v
3
3 ]
= [14009975, 4873348, 10691714]
because {
v32 − 23169852 = 14009975 · 17802608
v33 − 2257462 = v32 · 17802608
~v3 := ~v3 + ~v2 = [31812583, 28043200, 12949176]
4. i = 3 . . .
5. i = 4 . . .
6. i = 5 . . .
~v6 := (~v6 + ~v5) mod 29 = h.
4.3 Properties of DMACs
A cryptographic hash function must work as follows: a small change in the input drastically changes the
output. This is called avalanche effect. DMAC-1 and DMAC-2 were implemented and tested in Python.
Our DMACs are the case of a high-quality keyed hash functions (see Table 2). Results presented in table
are for the following parameters: graph D(32, 257), N = 32, h = 256. Output of the presented keyed hash
functions passed the well known Diehard tests, developed by George Marsaglia, for measuring the quality of
random number generators, [21].
As defined above h is the number of bits of the output (tag). Popular size of tags are h = 128 bits,
h = 256 bits, h = 512 bits and h = 1024 bits. When for most of commonly used algorithms the size of tag is
fixed (for example: SHA-3-224 and SHA-3-256), in our approach the tag can have arbitrary length. The size
of block length N can be chosen quite arbitrarily but it has to be much smaller than the size of the message
M and N ≥ l(q). The longer the size of block, the more efficient the algorithm. Notice that if l(q) = N then
message is encoded character by character and it becomes a kind of ’string’ algorithm.
The parameters of graph D(n,Q) that is used depend on the block size N and the size of tag h. The
paramater Q is chosen to satisfy the property the inequality Q ≥ 2N and the parameter n is chosen as the
smallest possible n that satisfies the inequality
h 6 n · l(q).
The most commonly used encodings are UTF-8 (l(q) = 8), UTF-16 (l(q) = 16), UTF-32 (l(q) = 32). The
Table 1 presents example values of n when h and alphabet Fq (l(q)) are fixed.
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Table 1: Example n values for fixed tag size h and coding
UTF-8 UTF-16 UTF-32
h
27 = 128 bits 27 = n23 ⇒ n = 24 27 = n24 ⇒ n = 23 27 = n25 ⇒ n = 22
28 = 256 bits n = 25 n = 24 n = 23
29 = 512 bits n = 26 n = 25 n = 24
210 = 1024 bits n = 27 n = 26 n = 25
Example 3. Let’s consider a message M of 2000 characters writen in UTF-8 (alphabet F28 ; l(q) = 8)
parameter S of 10 characters . We want to divide the message on blocks of 4 characters (N = 32 bits) and
compute a tag of length h = 512 bits for this message.
Parameter n can be computed from the formula h ≤ n · l(q):
512 = 8n⇒ 29 = 23n⇒ n = 64.
Then we choose a prime power Q such that
Q ≥ 232 ⇒ Q = 232.
Thus we use D(64, 232) graph. The length of the shortest cycle in this graph is g(D(64, 232)) = 68 and the
order of the graph is 2 · (232)64 = 22048.
5 Collision resistance and one way property
Recall that, the family of graphs is a family of graphs of large girth and g(D(n, q)) = 2[(n + 5)/2]. Hence
there are no cycles shorter than 2[(n + 5)/2] and therefore for numer of blocks smaller than [(n + 5)/2] no
collisions can be find. First, we consider the following problems.
Problem 1. Find a cycle in graph D(n,Q) that passes through vertex v0 and vl(M).
Problem 2. Find a path between vertex v0 and h in graph D(n,Q), that contains a subpath defined by S
that ends in h.
First of all we shall notice that the secret key is a pair (IV = v0, S). For an adversary that doesn’t know
the secret key those problems are not defined precisely. The problem of collision resistance is essentially
the problem of finding a shortest cycle in the graph D(n, q) (similarly as it was considered in [6] for other
graphs). We have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Finding a collision in DMACs is a solution to Problem 1.
Proof. If we set v0 to be zero vector then DMAC-1 and DMAC-2 are exactly the same functions. Finding
a collision in DMAC-2 cannot be easier than finding a collision in DMAC-1. Therefore, without lost of
generalisation we can consider collision resistance of DMAC-1.
To compute a hash DMAC-1 we start a walk in vertex v0 and an input M = m1m2 . . .ml(M) (message
M) gives us directions Mi how to walk in this graph. Each vertex is Q-regular and Mi ≤ Q so different
blocks correspond to different edges incydet to a given vertex. To find a collision we have to find two different
inputs M 6= M ′, which hash to the same output h. To calculate output h first we have to calculate vertex
vl(M) and then using secret S we can walk to vertex that corresponds to h. If vl(M) 6= vl(M ′) then S such
that: s < 12g(D(n,Q)) would lead us to different h and h
′ (g(D(n,Q) denotes the length of the shortest
cycle in graph). Hence, to find a collision we have to find two different inputs M 6= M ′, which leads us to
one vertex vl(M) = vl(M ′). Two paths in graph, that start and end in the same vertices form a cycle.
Graphs D(n, q) form a family of a simple graphs. In this case O(|V |) time is required to find a cycle
in an |V |-vertex graph, that starts in a given vertex. However here |V | = 2Qn so the complexity becomes
exponential. Then O(|V |) is a time required requaired to find any cycle. In our case we are looking for a
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specific cycle that contains also vl(M).
The family of graphs is a family of graphs of large girth and g(D(n, q)) = 2[(n + 5)/2]. Therefore, the
problem of finding a shortest cycle in D(n, q) graphs cannot be easier than the general problem of finding
the shortest path in a regular graph, which is considered to be hard.
Theorem 2. Finding a preimage of h is a solution to Problem 2.
Proof. Because of the reason given in the proof of Theorem 1, without lost of generalisation we can consider
preimage resistance of DMAC-1. If we have knowledge about S then vertex vl(M) can be computed. An input
M = m1m2 . . .ml(M) message gives us directions Mi how to walk in this graph. We start a walk in initial
vertex IV = ~v0. The second visited vertex is defined by the operator NM1(~v0) and uniquely determined from
equations (1). The next visited vertex is defined by the operator NM2(~v0) and uniquely determined from
equations (1). We repeat the calculations until we deal with all blocks mi. Graph D(n,Q) is Q-regular and
Mi 6 Q so different Mi gives us different directions. Each Mi corresponds exactly to one edge incidence to
a given vertex. There are many different paths from v0 to vl(M). Find the preimage is to find the right path
from v0 to vl(M). Notice that v0 is a part of a secret key.
Composition of operators NMi and NSi gives a nonlinear system of n − 1 cubic eqations (see Theorem
2 in [34]). Variables are: numbers Mi, s character of S and n coordinates of initial vertex v0. There is
l(M) + n+ s total variables in this system.
In general, solving a set of quadratic equations over a finite field is NP-hard (MQ problem) for any finite
field. There is a conjecture that this is a probabilistically hard problem and ShorâĂŹs algorithm cannot be
used to speed it up, [10]. Solving a set of cubic equations over a finite field cannot be easier than solving the
MQ problem. However, the system related to the set of equations 1 and other systems used for multivariate
cryptography are not random, for a large enough parameters it is computationally infeasible to solve them
(see [10]).
Brute force attack to completely break the keyed hash function (find secret Ks) may require to check qnqr
possibilities (qn possible initial vectors and qr possible passwords of length r), if we consider that the length
of the S is known. A very efficient algorithm to find the shortest path in a graph is Dijkstra’s algorithm
of complexity O(|V | log |V | + |E|) and it can be adopted to find collisions. In the case of the used graphs
it gives O(2Qn log(2Qn) + Qn+1) and it’s not more efficient than brute force. The complexity is increased
because calculations are made over bigger number field FQ, without changing the alphabet for IV and S.
6 Timings
The number of operations per bit of input depend on block length N and on the parameter n of the graph D(n,Q).
The number of field operations in the system of equations 1 is 2(n − 1) (one step of the walk in the graph D(n,Q)
costs 2(n− 1) field operations).
To process one block of input with DMAC-1 we need two additions and one multiplication as specified by operator
Nt(w) (to calculate the first coordinate of the neighbor), mod operation and 2(n − 1) field operations. After the
block is processed we process vector S. Therefore, the number of operations per bit of input for DMAC-1 is given by
the formula
(2n+ 2) · l(M) + (2n+ 2) · s
N · l(M) =
2n+ 2
N
(
1 +
s
l(M)
)
,
where r is the length of S and l(M) is the number of blocks, as specified above.
To process one block of input with DMAC-2 we need to add vectors over number field Fq which require n field
additions. It gives us the following formula for the number of operations per bit of input when DMAC-2 is used
(2n+ 2 + n)l(M) + (2n+ 2 + n)s
N · l(M) =
3n+ 2
N
(
1 +
s
l(M)
)
.
If the password S is short (not more than 10 characters) and the message, for which we want to calculate the tag,
is long (which is true in general when MACs are used) then r
l(M)
is very small. Notice that the change of number
field doesn’t increase much the number of operations per bit of input (except for the fact that resulting vector has to
be divided mod q).
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Table 2: Summary of the Tests
MAC
type
Original Message Output S IV
DMAC-1
The sky announced
a beautiful day: the
setting moon shane
pale in an immense
field of azure, which,
towards the east,
mingled itself lightly
with the rosy dawn.
49 a7 df d0 58 51 6a
9d 4e 94 2d 43 2a b9
60 f2 ab 22 5a a8 18
13 20 7d f7 1 5f ad 21
3f 56 45
hint [147, 217, 2582, 2976, 1718, 1599, 27,
1083, 471, 1461, 1076, 2255, 2875, 2696,
2793, 1015, 1477, 1271, 2856, 221, 961,
2839, 1789, 1845, 1157, 622, 758, 882,
210, 1846, 3009, 410]
The sky ... 2d 48 b6 e4 50 de 8b
d2 2e b4 1b d fb 9f b6
63 a1 7b e2 ee 4 e7 b1
ed 88 25 51 ca c4 7d
e3 36
hint [149, 219, 2582, 2976, 1718, 1599, 27,
1083, 471, 1461, 1076, 2255, 2875, 2696,
2793, 1015, 1477, 1271, 2856, 221, 961,
2839, 1789, 1845, 1157, 622, 758, 882,
210, 1846, 3009, 410]
The sky ... 78 46 b2 50 81 c1 ba
b2 c c4 e6 6c 7a 69 b4
fd c6 64 a 69 30 e0 4d
30 1e e7 9c 36 55 e d1
8a
hunt [147, 217, 2582, 2976, 1718, 1599, 27,
1083, 471, 1461, 1076, 2255, 2875, 2696,
2793, 1015, 1477, 1271, 2856, 221, 961,
2839, 1789, 1845, 1157, 622, 758, 882,
210, 1846, 3009, 410]
Da sky ... 86 f8 16 c5 dd 100 28
d1 91 8f 48 3c ff 3a a6
e2 b1 31 23 91 17 73
64 86 be 6b 81 ad 5e
10 67 56
hint [147, 217, 2582, 2976, 1718, 1599, 27,
1083, 471, 1461, 1076, 2255, 2875, 2696,
2793, 1015, 1477, 1271, 2856, 221, 961,
2839, 1789, 1845, 1157, 622, 758, 882,
210, 1846, 3009, 410]
DMAC-2
The sky announced a
beautiful day...
6f ed d1 fb 2f cf 56 fc
a9 5e c8 1d 90 ec f7
4a df 42 1a 1e 3b 16
62 54 90 81 a2 a4 7e
3f 8d db
red [147, 217, 2582, 2976, 1718, 1599, 27,
1083, 471, 1461, 1076, 2255, 2875, 2696,
2793, 1015, 1477, 1271, 2856, 221, 961,
2839, 1789, 1845, 1157, 622, 758, 882,
210, 1846, 3009, 410]
The sky ... 59 9 c2 a b1 ba 88 1b
12 e7 f3 a 65 71 87 7b
25 c4 20 57 38 6e 54
b0 b8 19 74 5b d8 33
46 d
rid [147, 217, 2582, 2976, 1718, 1599, 27,
1083, 471, 1461, 1076, 2255, 2875, 2696,
2793, 1015, 1477, 1271, 2856, 221, 961,
2839, 1789, 1845, 1157, 622, 758, 882,
210, 1846, 3009, 410]
The sky ... d7 92 60 73 0 dd ef fa
6 3 f2 c6 9b 62 c6 58
e7 59 31 a5 2d 5e 34
67 7d a9 95 30 86 12
9a e0
red [149, 221, 2582, 2976, 1718, 1599, 27,
1083, 471, 1461, 1076, 2255, 2875, 2696,
2793, 1015, 1477, 1271, 2856, 221, 961,
2839, 1789, 1845, 1157, 622, 758, 882,
210, 1846, 3009, 410]
Da sky ... 54 c7 8 d3 d9 fc c1 ed
57 18 9d 74 62 d2 5d
35 5a cd 15 3c b7 19
9a 3c 79 1d 4c 68 69
3b d8 6b
red [147, 217, 2582, 2976, 1718, 1599, 27,
1083, 471, 1461, 1076, 2255, 2875, 2696,
2793, 1015, 1477, 1271, 2856, 221, 961,
2839, 1789, 1845, 1157, 622, 758, 882,
210, 1846, 3009, 410]
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Example 4. Lets consider data like in Example 3. The length of M in bits is 2000 · l(q) = 2000 · 8. The block length
is N = 32 bits so the number of blocks l(M) =
2000 · 8
32
= 500. In this case the number of field operations per bit of
input is
130
32
(
1 +
10
500
)
+
64
2000 · 8 ≈ 4,
which is very efficient.
7 Conclusions
A new technique for message authentication was presented in this work. To the best of our knowledge, the family
of graphs D(n, q) has never been used before in this context. The algorithms here introduced, for DMAC-1 and
DMAC-2 respectively, were implemented in Python and tested with different inputs. The results of our tests and
the theoretical base show that the technique we introduce is a very efficient and safe approach to compute message
authentication code.
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